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Key concepts 
Risk refers to possibly occurring events that can damage wellbeing (Dercon 2001). Others 
prefer the talk about damaging fluctuations that are not perfectly predictable (Sinha and 
Lipton 1999). Both definitions allow to point out that households can have a priori some 
sense of the likelihood of events occurring (i.e., can attach a probability distribution to risk 
events), without really having any direct control over them (i.e., they are not perfectly certain 
that will occur in any given future).
1 Some authors find useful to make a distinction between 
risk and shocks as well implying that shocks go one step further in the definition of risks. 
They are defined as realizations of highly unexpected events that cause welfare losses. In 
other words, risks are prospects of a shock or, alternatively, shocks can be thought as the 
realization of risks (Fafchamps 2004; Sinha and Lipton 1999). According to Sinha and Lipton 
(1999) the term ‘shocks’ has already a very specific connotation that encompasses: i) 
unexpectedness (i.e. the risky damaging fluctuation already happened, though it had low ex-
ante probability); ii) size, iii) high damage due to concentration on persons with high 
vulnerability and low resilience; iv) exogenousness in the source; and v) physical or 
psychological strain to one or more individuals due to that stress. Thus, the term climate 
shock would already cover what the disaster literature considers to be a natural disaster: those 
events that outstrip the capacity of a society to cope with it (Anderson, 2000). This note 
mostly refers to natural disasters as climate shocks. 
Household assets are the stock of wealth used to generate wellbeing (Siegel and 
Alwang 1999). They are usually divided into tangible and intangible. In the first case, they 
design things such as natural, human, physical and financial capitals. More specifically, 
human capital alludes to the household member’s education and their health status. Physical 
capital is associated with productive assets such as land, tools, equipment and work animals, 
and with household assets such as housing and household services, or stocks such as 
livestock, food and jewelry. Finally, financial capital will refer to cash, savings, and access to 
credit. Intangible assets result from the interaction of members within households as well as 
from households with each other inside the community and beyond. These include gender 
relations, social ties and networks, including participation in associations and organizations, 
and intra-household relations. Households and communities can strengthen linkages with 
other communities participating in regional politics, marriage and migration, but also being 
part of inclusive political systems and markets (Siegel and Alwang 1999). And finally, at the 
community and extra-community level physical, environmental and social infrastructure 
remains fundamental, such as the existence of schools and clinics, forests and rivers and 
communication infrastructure. 
To assess the impact of climate shocks on household assets one can rely on the 
concepts of sensitivity and resilience. The former refers to the magnitude of a system’s 
response to an external event or, in other words, the extent to which a household’s asset base 
is likely to resist or not (following responses to) a shock given the intensity with which it was 
experienced. The later refers to the ease and rapidity of a system’s recovery from stress or, in 
other words, the household’s ability to resist negative shocks and to recover from them 
(Bayliss-Smith 1991; Davies 1996). More than identifying both dimensions in particular 
shocks, the HDR team is interested in the implications they could have for the analysis of 
climate shocks on assets. The extent to which a household is sensitive to a climate shock is 
obviously determined by its characteristics of the shock itself -most notably its covariate 
nature and the length, frequency and severity with which hits- and by the assets it has at hand 
to cushion the impact of the shock. The resilience of a household has a straight connection 
with the strategies employed by households to manage risks. This means that not only the 
type of natural disaster that people face, but also how they call on their assets in times of 
stress can have important implications for their future livelihoods. In other words, the 
methods of using assets to relieve the pressures of a shock after it occurs (i.e., the coping  
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strategies) will have important implications for their ability to ‘bounce back’ to their pre-
shock asset levels. 
 
Channels of impact 
The physical contact of climate shocks with humans and/or with property can bring death, 
injury, disruption of socio-economic activities and damage or destruction to property and 
natural resources and other physical assets. Since some of these assets can be transformed into 
income-enhancing productive activities to entitle households to goods and services that 
provide access to different dimensions of wellbeing, including consumption, nutrition, and 
health, their depletion can lead into short-term welfare fluctuations and push people into 
sudden poverty.  
More importantly, the capacity of households to lift- stay out of poverty could be 
further compromised by climate shocks in the long-range. This could happen in two broad 
ways. In the short-run environmental factors such as flooding, storms or drought may cause 
the physical extinction of some assets, but access to public or private sources of recovery 
would prevent any worsening of this impact. If households have restricted means to protect 
the most vulnerable members inside them, such as the children under 3, shocks can have long-
lasting effects on them through nutrition shortfalls that in turn could affect their human 
development later in life. In addition, if households have few means to react to natural 
disasters they can end up adopting strategies with high costs in the future, such as dropping 
children from school or depleting their few available productive assets. Furthermore, even 
when adequate mechanisms to mitigate and cope with shocks are in place their application 
can further compromise food security, human development, and growth prospects if the 
climate shocks persist over several years in a row or the covariate nature of the problem is not 
well understood: the value of assets could drop if all affected household try to sell them at 
once. Finally, the inability of households to hold to their meagre asset bases in the presence of 
climate shocks will most likely end up affecting their asset recovery efforts too as they exit 
the shocks with few assets left. Therefore, special attention should be devoted to poor 
populations across developed and developing countries whose assets are scarce and whose 
access to credit and insurance markets is restricted. 
This connects with the second and often much less explored channel through which 
climate shocks can affect assets. This happens before the shock actually takes place and is 
explained through the existence of risk aversion motivations combined with a limited number 
of assets - including liquidity constraints and restricted access to insurance markets – that cast 
a shadow over the household perspectives for dealing with the consequences of a climate 
shock. This scenario would be conducive to the adoption of suboptimal asset portfolios for 
organizing a livelihood where the value and productivity of assets declines.  
In short, climate shocks can affect assets in many ways. First, through the impact on 
their amount, value and productivity. This could be the direct result from the shock or a 
ramification of its impact through the absence or inadequate application of coping 
mechanisms. Poor households tend to pay a higher cost for mitigating and coping with risk 
due to their reduced asset base. This is reflected in the human capital of its members, 
particularly the children, and the forced disposal of physical assets; in addition, any asset 
recovery efforts are more difficult to achieve. The same attributes of value and productivity 
are likely to be affected before climate shocks occur as households reallocate assets in 
response to risk exposure (asset portfolio influences a household’s risk attitudes). For 
instance, households with higher physical and human capital endowments, tend to be less risk 
averse, more efficient in resource allocation, and better situated to handle risk-related losses. 
In contrast, poorer households tend to adopt risk management strategies that concentrate in 
lower risk and lower return assets, which can lead to poverty traps. 
Most disasters occur in poor countries and the people who bear the brunt of them are 
usually those who are poor (World Bank 2000). This is true in at least two senses: first, 
natural disasters are more frequent in developing countries, and second, the poor are more 
likely to suffer damages from natural hazards as usually they can only afford to live in 
marginal areas and have a limited ability to manage these risks.
2 For instance, people in low- 
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income countries are four times as likely as people in high-income countries to die in a 
natural disaster (World Bank 2000). Hence, this review is mostly concerned with the 
empirical evidence across poor populations in the developing world.  
 
SENSITIVITY 
Climate shocks have immediate effects on assets 
Wealth can be substantially damaged by the occurrence of extreme climate events, such as 
floods, droughts, hurricanes and other weather-related shocks. Most obviously, there are 
‘direct’ impacts caused by physical contact of these hazardous events with humans and/or 
with property that result in death, injury, disruption of socio-economic activities and damage 
or destruction to property and natural resources and other physical assets. 
The injuries, disabilities and loss of life occasioned by natural disasters is by far the 
most notable impact on any livelihood and its assets, particularly if this involves the 
breadwinner or any other working-age members. This is so because the poor tend to lack 
material assets, and thus labour in all its forms, including formal wage employment, informal 
work for cash, unpaid labour and subsistence production, remains the most important resource 
that they have to face vulnerability. In that sense, the devastating impacts of Hurricane Mitch 
raging over Central America in 1998 and the tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean in 
December 2004 are well captured by their respective death tolls: 10,000 people killed and 
three million homeless, mostly from flood-related disasters in Honduras and Nicaragua, and 
over 200,000 lives and more than 1.5 million people homeless in the tsunami affected 
countries (World Bank 2005).  
If assets are considered intrinsically valuable, then when climate shocks hit human 
capital that may also push people into current poverty. Here human capital assets, in 
particular health, become an extra category to the multidimensionality of poverty just as it 
happens with low levels of consumption or income. For instance, substantial increases in 
illness followed the 1998 floods in Bangladesh even after the floodwaters had receded 
partially or totally: in a sample of 757 households obtained from a multi-round survey in 
seven flood-affected areas 9.6 percent of individuals suffered from diarrhoea, and 4.7 percent 
were affected by respiratory illness in the immediate post-shock period (Del Ninno et al. 
2001). 
Finally, the reduction or extinction of physical assets due to climate shocks is a third 
impact that becomes immediately visible, both at the household and communal level. Take as 
an example the floods in Bangladesh in 1998, which inundated two-thirds of the country for 
an unprecedented 11 weeks starting in July damaging an estimated 15,000 kilometres of 
roads, 14,000 schools, and thousands of bridges and culverts affecting their externalities and 
public good attributes. Besides public infrastructure, the floods damaged over 500,000 homes, 
production, and productive inputs, and significantly altered agricultural patterns and lowered 
farming yields (Narayan et al. 2000). All this can lead to short-term fluctuations in well-being 
as physical assets are usually combined with other forms of capital and transformed into 
income-generating activities or activities that entitle households to goods and services that 
provide access to different dimensions of wellbeing, including as consumption, nutrition, and 
health.  
Because most assets are stocks –as opposed to income and consumption flows- and 
the poor usually report more difficulties to recover from disruptions as explained below, the 
rest of this note concentrates on the extent to which the loss of wealth for deprived sectors of 
the population could compromise their health and socio-economic development in the 
medium to long-run.  
 
But can also have long-lasting effects… 
As noted initially, assets are stocks that can be combined and transformed to generate income 
and satisfy consumption and other essential needs and so if they become affected by climate 
shocks that could generate short term welfare fluctuations. More importantly if households 
have few assets to protect vulnerable groups inside them during hardships this can transform 




3 The most common example found in the literature relates to rainfall shocks causally 
related to human capital formation: temporary poor health and child malnutrition that results 
from a drought could turn into stunting (height-for-age levels below some level observed in 
healthy populations), lower school achievement, and attainment, as well as lower health and 
lower wages and productivity as an adult. 
 
  On health and education 
The nutrition and food security literature have widely documented the effect that short-term 
blows to nutrition could have on health conditions through stunting, especially on the 
children. Tracing the impact of the 1982-84 droughts in Zimbabwe it was found that the 
temporary hunger followed by stunting of those children aged between 12 and 24 months at 
the time of the drought –recognised as the most critical time for child growth- led to lower 
height (2.3 centimetres) in late adolescence as well as delays in school enrolment (3.7 
months) and reduction in grade completion (0.4 grades) 13 to 16 years after the droughts 
(Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey 2006). The educational setbacks are probably mediated by 
the slow height growth in children (Glewwe, Jacoby and King 2000). Similarly, the 1994/95 
drought in that country lowered annual growth rates of children in the same age group by 
somewhere between 1.5 and 2 cm., and four years after the failure of the rains in 1994/95, 
these children remained shorter than identically aged children who had not experienced this 
drought (Hoddinott and Kinley 2001). 
Consistent with the findings in Zimbabwe, drought shocks (expressed through crop 
damage) in Ethiopia over the period 1995/96 had a large detrimental effect on child health. 
Children aged six to twenty four months experienced about a 0.9 cm growth loss in height 
over a six-month period when half of their crop was damaged compared to communities 
whose percentage of damaged crop area was 50% points lower. Put in a different way, a 10 
percent point increase in the proportion of damaged plot areas corresponded to a reduction in 
child growth by 0.12 cm over a six month period (Yamano et al. 2005). Similarly, Hurricane 
Mitch in Nicaragua made the children in affected areas 30% less likely to be taken for 
medical consultation conditional on being sick, even though there was no significant 
difference on the prevalence of illness between affected and non-affected children. 
Furthermore, the probability of being undernourished among children in regions hit by Mitch 
almost quadrupled (8.7 percentage points increase) and the overall distribution of their 
nutritional status –especially of those in the tail– worsened significantly as a result of the 
storm (Baez and Santos, 2007). 
The damage to physical infrastructure and child labour are additional channels 
through which climate shocks can have an effect on children’s educational attainment in the 
long-run. An examination into the determinants of completed grades of schooling amongst 
adults born in four villages in eastern Guatemala found that the 1976 earthquake in that 
country had a statistically significant impact on the number of grades attained. By 
constructing three measures of school quality (whether all six grades of primary schooling 
were offered; the ratio of teachers to grades taught and the ability of a preschool) and 
comparing them with whether schools closed after the 1976 earthquake and controlling for 
individual’s sex, cohort effects and locality fixed effects, two measures of school quality were 
found to be affected by the covariate shock (Stein et al. 2003). The quality of school 
attainment could also be compromised by child labour. Three years after Hurricane Mitch hit 
Nicaragua in 1998 no significant effect was found on school enrolment, however, labour force 
participation increased by 58% among children in areas affected by the hurricane. Similarly, 
the proportion of children simultaneously enrolled in school and working more than doubled, 
going from 7.5% to 15.6% (Baez and Santos 2007).  
 Children are not the only group highly exposed to natural disasters. Studies of the 
1994–95 drought in Zimbabwe showed that women along with young children were the most 
affected while no impact on men’s health was found. For women, though, the drought’s effect 
on health was temporary. With good rains the following year, they regained much of the lost 
body mass. But sometimes the differentiated impact can be life-threatening. In a group of 
4,118 households in 16 states in India surveyed from 1969 to 1971 child mortality rates  
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increased during periods of very low rainfall and were significantly higher for girls than for 
boys (Rose 1999). In recent times, during the 2004 tsunami more women than men died. This 
was highlighted early on when Oxfam announced that, in the villages it had surveyed, there 
were three times as many adult male survivors as female ones, with some districts reaching 
female death percent rates of 77 and 80 (Oxfam 2005). Evidence that women’s deaths 
outnumber men’s also can be found after the 1991 Bangladesh cyclone, as well as the 1993 
Maharashtra earthquake.  
Women and men have different vulnerabilities, and they cope with disasters 
differently. However, on balance, female-headed households fare worse than male-headed 
households following a natural disaster, in part because of their smaller average resource base 





Vulnerable Groups during the Indian Ocean tsunami 
On December 2004, a massive earthquake struck off the west coast of Northern Sumatra. This 
led to the most destructive series of tsunamis in recorded history, affecting up to 14 countries around 
the Indian Ocean. Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, India and Thailand were the hardest hit with 
entire coastal zones being destroyed, and the tsunamis causing damage up to 3km inland in some cases. 
The magnitude of the tsunami disaster is dramatically captured by the death tolls: over 
227,000 people lost their lives and some 1.7 million were displaced. This raw death toll, however, 
masks the disproportionate effect which the tsunamis had over some of the most vulnerable groups. In 
the Maldives those aged 65 or over, though comprising only 3.1 per cent of the population, accounted 
for 17.3 per cent of the deaths. Elsewhere the tsunami typically claimed more people under-15s and 
over-50s, with countries varying as to which of these two groups had the highest mortality rates.  
Substantial gender imbalances in terms of fatalities were also present. Several studies across 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India looking at the mortality risk for females compared to males found 
consistently higher ratios for females varying from 1.2 (1.2 times as many women died) to 2.1, with 
wide variations for individual villages. Overall, the tsunami killed 40,000 to 45,000 more women than 
men. 
Some of the reasons given for the gender and age differences in survival rates in these 
disasters are usually related to strength and stamina, and the ability to swim or climb trees. For 
instance, one study in Tamil Nadu found that women who were able to swim were more than twice as 
likely to survive. However, it is clear that pre-existing vulnerabilities, whether socioeconomic, 
environmental, political, psychological, age- or gender-based, also contributed to the multiple 
differentiated impacts cited. In women, for instance, a number of factors contributed to their particular 
vulnerability before, during, and after the tsunamis: a lack of information about evacuation warnings 
and shelter options, culturally restricted mobility, and responsibilities within the family that make 
women stay behind to care for the young and the elderly. Moreover, governments not always 
recognised or advanced their property rights during the post-tsunami implementation of housing, 
relocation and livelihood strategies. During the response phase, female-dominated businesses, such as 
small-scale cottage industries and fish processing, were not always as visible as businesses run by men, 
and were less likely to be supported with livelihood recovery grants. There were also concerns about 
women being excluded from cash grant projects. In Sri Lanka, Oxfam found that women experienced 
difficulties in accessing benefits, especially cash payments and rations, because families are usually 
registered for government and insurance purposes under the man’s name’. Similarly, in the Maldives, 
women with small businesses often had no official registration and because they could not prove that 
they had lost their livelihoods, they did not qualify for assistance. 
Policy interventions should be tailored to the special needs of all these vulnerable groups to 
climate shocks —women, children, and the elderly—; and particularly sensitive to possible forms of 
discrimination against them during recovery. Involving women in the management of shelters, 
targeting female-headed households for support to lighten their workload, ensuring equity of treatment 
on employment as well as gender neutrality in housing acquisition and access to land ownership, and 
establishing workfare programs adapted to their needs, can all improve the recovery for women and 
households headed by women. Expanding early childhood development programs for newborn infants 
is also very important so as rebuilding schools —to avoid loss of human capital for those already in 
school-age and providing shelter for displaced people, including the elder.  
A notable response along these lines during the tsunami came through the involvement of 
women groups in cash for work projects and helping them understand their right to equal pay for equal 
work as unskilled labour performed by women usually earns less than for men. This was the focus of 
the Indian NGO NESA’s cash for work (CFW) program in India, which included seeding of 
plantations, pond and canal renovations, among other projects. While many men objected to this, the 
NGO insisted on it –as indeed it would have contravened labour laws if the wages had been different- 
and women were able to participate and have a say on how cash was spent. NESA’s CFW project also 
strove to change attitudes and behaviour towards dalit households – at the bottom of the Hindu caste 
hierarchy- by involving them in the cash economy through CFW projects developing community assets 
which they had hitherto been excluded from. Participation in the CFW project in these areas in effect 
renegotiated access by these groups to these resources, including women within them. 
 





The shocks’ persistence on the health, nutritional and educational status of children 
could have further repercussions on their earning potential during adulthood. Looking at the 
1982/83/84 drought in Zimbabwe and using the values for the returns to education and 
age/job experience in the Zimbabwean manufacturing sector, it was found that 16 years later 
those children affected by the drought had 7 percent loss of lifetime earnings (Alderman, 
Hoddinott and Kinsey 2006). The mechanisms through which reduced height of a child could 
lead to lower productivity and lifetime earnings as an adult are the following: i) lower adult 
height associated with reduced earnings as an adult (Thomas and Strauss, 1997); ii) poorer 
cognitive function as a child associated with poorer cognitive achievement as an adult which 
could lead to lower adult earnings; iii) shorter stature as a child is associated with slower 
progress through schooling which bring delays for enjoying its benefits once finished or 
simply not finishing produces less grades completed and thus an impact on wages; and iv) 
stature by age three is strongly correlated with attained body size at adulthood which in case 
of deficit could lead to the early onset of chronic diseases and premature mortality among 
male due to increased risk of cardiovascular and obstructive lung disease (Fogel, 1994), 
though no evidence for developing countries exists on this yet. The early onset of chronic 
diseases could turn into reduced life expectancy leading to shorter productivity or lifetime 
earnings (Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey 2006). 
Rainfall shocks can also result in lower adult agricultural productivity and wages 
through their impact on adult’s Body Mass Index (weight in kilograms
 divided by squared 
height
 in meters) rather than children’s height and intellectual development (Dercon and 
Krishnan, 2000). An investigation into the ability of household to smooth consumption in 
Ethiopia show that rainfall shocks during 1994/95 significantly affected adult Body Mass 
Index. Even though rainfall was relatively favourable in this period, relatively poor rainfall in 
some communities lowered BMI by about 0.9 percent for households with low landholdings, 
suggesting that the absence of effective risk management strategies was costly in terms of 
adult health.
4 Moreover, the
 observed scale of adult
 malnutrition had functional consequences 
and
 affected labour productivity. In particular, clear
 correlations were found between 
malnutrition and
 the ability to perform
 standard tasks, such as hoeing a field or carrying water 
(Dercon and Krishnan 2000).
5 
Rainfall shocks could affect socioeconomic status at adulthood besides earnings and 
productivity through a series of pathways that start at child health and end up in the choice of 
a more educated partner. On examining the effect in 2000 of weather conditions around the 
time of birth on the health, education, and socioeconomic outcomes of Indonesian adults born 
between 1953 and 1974,
6 it was found that women with 20% higher rainfall in their year and 
location of birth attained 0.14 cm greater height, finished 0.15 more years of schooling, lived 
in households with 5.2% higher expenditures per capita, and have spouses with 5.1% higher 
earnings. The proposed causality to reach this outcomes was as follows: The positive impact 
of rainfall on agricultural output at the time of birth lead to higher household incomes and 
better health for infant girls. More importantly, suggestive evidence was presented that 
eventual benefits for adult women’s socioeconomic status are mediated by improved 
schooling attainment, which leads to higher spousal quality, which in turn improves 
socioeconomic status (Maccini and Yang, 2006). 
The relevance of shocks to child growth beyond their immediate health or nutritional 
effect or the long-term productivity effect could alert of a possible intergenerational 
transmission of poorer health status resulting from a drought shock. A human development 
trap could be backed by some epidemiological evidence that taller adult women experience 
fewer complications during child birth, have children with higher birth weights and 
experience lower risks of child and maternal mortality (World Bank 1993).  
The policy implications are obvious: earlier interventions that shield children from 
potential damages of natural disasters on their human capital can reduce the likelihood of 





Droughts in Zimbabwe: repercussions and interventions to handle them 
In rural Zimbabwe most households are regularly exposed to food shortage risk as a result of 
drought, but at the same time Zimbabwe is one of the more developed countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
with markets more likely to function relatively well, making efficient responses to the risk of drought 
possible. It has been possible to test this and other hypotheses in a group of some 400 rural households 
for over a decade (1983-96) in which the country has experienced four major droughts (1982-84, 1986-
87, 1991-92 and 1994-95), including the most serious drought in the living memory of the country 
(1991-92). 
In each drought private and public measures have been taken to thwart any possible negative 
effects. For instance, in the 1992 drought a series of government initiatives, including free food 
distributions for the elderly and the disabled and food-for-work programs for destitute families with 
able-bodied members were put in place. Assistance with school and examination fees was provided as 
well as child feeding supplementary programs. Households also implemented their own mechanisms to 
cope with food shortage, the most important of which had been cattle sales.  
Yet, there was little evidence that children from poor or nutritionally vulnerable households 
got preferential access to the public feeding schemes. Moreover, the extent of action by the 
Zimbabwean government had been impeded by the regularity of the previous successive droughts 
which brought about continuous risk-mitigation program demands. The core budget for the Department 
of Social Welfare, for example, declined in real terms by some 50% from the 1991-92 droughts to the 
next one in 1994-95. 
Overall back in 1992 food consumption fell in spite of the variety of smoothing mechanisms 
employed by households and government. Households cut sharply the quantity served at meals. At the 
peak of the drought almost a third of the panel households took only one meal per day and another 50% 
only two meals. In addition, nearly 70% of households reduced the quantity served at meals, and about 
a third of households consumed “wild foods”, such as edible plants, fruits and seeds, as well as animals 
and insects. 
Such inability to smooth consumption is even more serious as the short-term blows to 
nutrition could translate into stunting, especially on the children. For instance, tracing the impact of the 
1982-84 droughts it was found that the temporary hunger followed by stunting of those children aged 
between 12 and 24 months at the time of the drought –recognised as the most critical time for child 
growth- led to lower height (2.3 centimetres) in late adolescence as well as delays in school enrolment 
(3.7 months) and reduction in grade completion (0.4 grades) 13 to 16 years after the droughts. 
Similarly, the 1994/95 drought lowered annual growth rates of children in the same age group by 
somewhere between 1.5 and 2 cm., and four years after the failure of the rains in 1994/95, these 
children remained shorter than identically aged children who had not experienced the drought. 
Furthermore, the shocks’ persistence on the health, nutritional and educational status of 
children had further repercussions on their earning potential during adulthood. Looking back at the 
1982-84 droughts and using the values for the returns to education and age/job experience in the 
Zimbabwean manufacturing sector, it was found that 16 years later those children affected by the 
drought had 7 percent loss of lifetime earnings.  
All this damage which compromised the human development of children and jeopardized 
long-run potential gains achieved through their human capital underscores the relevance of adopting 
effective measures against recurrent droughts. In particular, a gradual shift from the emergency relief 
measures described, including cyclical public safety net responses, towards ex ante actions that could 
enhance wellbeing and reduce poverty making households more resilient to hardships seems desirable.  
An empirical study tracking the same group of rural Zimbabwean households this time over 
five years (1992-1996) with the 1994-5 drought episode in the midst compared the income effect of the 
observed ex post public responses to drought (grain loans) against the effect of a counterfactual ex ante 
intervention two years prior to the shock (provision of capital and extension services). After developing 
an empirical model in which capital and extension services increase net crop incomes that in turn 
increase holdings of agricultural tools and livestock without crowding out private transfers, the value of 
the assistance transferred to households in the form of grain loans was reallocated into households in 
the form of capital and extension services to run a series of counterfactuals. Doing so reduced poverty 
in non-drought years and at the same time allowed households to build up enough buffer stock to 
protect against the potential droughts. Incidentally, additional livestock only reduced marginally the 
impact of the drought in income terms, but it might have assisted positively children anthropometric 
measures as another study looking at children aged 12-24 months residing in households below and 
above the median value of pre-drought livestock holdings during the 1994/95 drought found that the 
shock only affected the growth height of children residing in households with little livestock. 




In accordance with the theory of optimal savings, more liquid assets and savings in the form 
of livestock or other non-fungible items might imply less vulnerability for those households 
which face substantial climate risks but cannot smooth consumption through insurance or 
credit (Fafchamps et al. 1998). In many rural areas, including sub-Saharan Africa, livestock 
herds are the main way to compensate the failure of access to credit and insurance markets. 
However, during droughts many factors affect the capacity of the household to turn this 
productive asset into a better command over food – the trades of terms with other goods of 
consumption deteriorate, high covariance with other sources of income and death 
susceptibility. In the Ethiopian drought of the late nineties, livestock herds began to decline as 
early as late 1997 due to death, but a larger number were also sold at ‘throwaway’ prices of 
30 per cent or less of normal rates. Group interviews at the time (1999) showed that livestock 
sales were the main drought coping mechanism for 90 per cent of male and 71 per cent of 
female herd owners. Sales and physical extinction brought aggregate declines in oxen and 
total herds of almost 40 per cent from 1998 to mid-2000. 
Moreover, when households start with very low levels of livestock the effects of 
drought on livestock can go beyond the inability to meet short-term needs. In the same study 
of Ethiopia, those families with few livestock had limited breeding in their herds. In contrast 
to better off households who usually manage to get back to their asset lots, they were forced 
to borrow or purchase animals during the post-drought period when livestock prices were 
especially high, and were also constrained in pursuing cultivation just as conditions were 
improving. This difficulty for re-stocking herds contributed to the fact that 95 per cent of 
those households with one or fewer TLU remained poor or vulnerable after six years in the 
study (Little, et al., 2006). Another study of famine effects in the Horn of Africa during the 
mid 1980s confirmed the harshness for households to improve or recover their status: 10 
years after the famine, cattle holdings in Ethiopian households were still only two-thirds what 
they were just before the famine (Dercon 2002). 
Sometimes households intentionally destabilize consumption to conserve livestock 
during a drought (Udry 2006). The deliberate postponement of short-term consumption to 
preserve the future sustainability of the livelihood by conserving productive asset is not 
uncommon either, but the implications of going hungry are then unknown. Ideally, access to 
credit services in a post-disaster situation will enhance the coping capacity of the poor not 
only by helping them to smooth consumption, but also by preventing them from the need to 
make distress sales of assets such as land or livestock at bargain prices while allowing faster 
replacement of lost assets. 
 
On land and housing 
Although access to land and housing varies widely from one context to another and is often 
illegal and insecure, where available it represents more than shelter to ensure physical 
wellbeing. In the urban context, housing makes up for failures observed across formal labour 
markets. It can become an important productive asset to generate income through rental 
opportunities and the use of its space for home-based production activities as well as 
collateral to access credit and other formal risk management mechanisms to fulfil emergency 
loans for consumption purposes or shield other productive assets during shocks.  
However, a set of elements usually conspire against housing and land rendering them 
highly ineffective to smooth any impact. Land pressures force people to move into areas at 
risk of floods or landslides. This limited access to appropriate housing markets translate into 
lack of land rights, for example shantytowns, which means there is little incentive to make 
adaptations to dwellings so that they are more able to withstand damage. It also means that 
authorities can refuse services and infrastructure to illegal settlements. Hence, the resulting 
bad quality of housing, infrastructure and services exacerbates the degree of exposure against 
climate hazards. 
If the usual replacements against credit market failures, such as land and livestock in 
rural areas and housing material and personal belongings in urban areas are affected by 
natural calamities the prospects of recovery become distant.  In post-Mitch Honduras, when  
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household experienced housing loss, the recovery of productive assets was significantly 
slowed by approximately 10%. When people’s homes were destroyed, they lose a valuable 
asset and even their means to make a living as they lose tools and materials.
7 
An in-depth qualitative study of poverty and vulnerability carried out in 10 
Guatemalan villages in 2000 also revealed how natural disasters can have long-lasting 
negative effects on the welfare of families through the destruction of physical key assets. 
Some 25 years after the earthquake of 1976 in that country many respondents reported still 
living in homes that were badly damaged by it. Similarly, the experience of one ladino village 
located in the Nororiente Region of the country reflected how Hurricane Mitch completely 
wiped out the main productive base of some villages. Prior to the hurricane, the main source 
of income for the village was agriculture, with a diverse range of production: lemons, papaya, 
tobacco, melons, eggplant, palms for raw material from artisan work, corn for subsistence, 
and livestock. In the aftermath of Mitch, however, land was severely damaged, rendering it 
largely infertile because the flooding basically washed away the productive topsoil and 
dumped rocks all over the fields. Livestock animals and farm implements were also destroyed 
forcing most individuals to travel elsewhere to look for jobs, with some 400 (half of the 
village population) migrating to the capital or to the US and leaving their families behind 
(Tesliuc and Lindert 2002). 
In cases where housing and land are being permanently affected by climate hazards it 
becomes almost impossible for households to improve their lives and reduce their long-term 
vulnerability. In Bangladesh, the population living in the char lands
8 which form and re-form 
on an annual or longer basis with changes in courses along all of the major rivers due to 
floods becomes periodically landless and homeless. It is estimated that 4.3 million inhabitants 
of the char lands in the major river system comprise the most vulnerable group in this 
country. The recurrent destruction of agricultural land and village settlements limits their 
opportunities to relieve debt and attain savings. Moreover, displacees are not only removed 
from their socio-economic structures, but usually enter the urban workforce with marked 
disadvantages because of their lower levels of education and lack of marketable working 
skills (Hutton and Haque 2004). 
 
…And very possibly in social capital 
The lack of access to formal credit and insurance markets is also compensated informally 
through mutual support networks. However, it is increasingly acknowledged that family and 
community support mechanisms come under stress during natural disasters, including 
drought-induced famines (Rahmato 1988; de Waal 1989). In principle, the mobilization of 
support inside communities during common shocks should be harder because everyone is 
affected and thus risk cannot be shared (Skoufias 2003). Even more fundamentally, the 
persistence of poverty heightened by continuous climate shocks leaves little time for 
association and social action with others as the families have to use most of their time to 
ensure  their basic needs. Women’s community activities and links between nuclear and 
extended families may be reduced due to the need for women to leave their home and search 
extra work as well as children for participating in productive activities. All this could lead to 
weakened relationships with the extended family and ineffective reciprocal exchange with 
neighbours and even anger and resentment. 
A study comprising 500 households living in prefabricated houses in three provinces 
of Turkey after the 1999 East Marmara earthquake found that this shock torn apart the fabric 
of society. The survivors lost their houses, shops and durable goods and their rent. They were 
forced to liquidate their savings and faced strong pressures of indebtedness. This reinforced 
the difficulties for dealing with the hardship even in the presence of social networks because 
households had in general less financial means and hence more constrained to give away. In 
consequence, a second factor identified as social solidarity, which included items of solidarity 
among friends, neighbours, relatives, countrymen and within the family before and after the 
earthquake was also adversely affected. Inter familial ties and support relations with relatives, 
neighbours and fellow immigrants after the earthquake were strained and almost broken as 
people were hardly able to think and care about others (Kasapoglu and Ecevit 2003).  
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Another channel that needs to be explored is the impact of migrations and 
displacement provoked by climate shocks as possible sources of distress. The cohesion of 
households and communities certainly erodes when men and women are forced to migrate to 
find employment. Family members left behind for long stretches have less time and fewer 
resources to contribute to and sustain community relations. In addition, migration can reduce 
social cohesion in the host community.  
There is no conclusive evidence in this respect. The existing literature seems to 
acknowledge that migration is one of the primary responses to a natural disaster. Yet, a couple 
of empirical studies reviewed go against the tide by showing either non-occurrence of out-
migration in the aftermath of a tornado in Bangladesh in 2004 (Paul 2005) or at least the 
maintenance of rural reciprocity networks despite flood-induced migration (Hutton and 
Haque 2004).   
 
Short and long-term impacts on assets are borne disproportionately by the poor 
Short and long-term climate shock impacts are more likely to be observed across poor 
households as these can only afford to live in marginal areas and have a limited ability to 
manage risks due to their low asset holdings and manifest constraints to access credit and 
insurance markets. In rural areas, for instance, land pressures lead small farmers to retreat 
further into steep mountain regions. This could have fatal consequences. In the 1977 floods in 
Andhra Pradesh, India, the 23-27% death rate for small farmers and fisherman, contrasted 
with the 3% death rate for large farmers and local level officials. The later non-poor group 
was less vulnerable to the cyclone because of their ability to speedily evacuate by road, the 
type and strength of their houses, and the small variations in topography in their residential 
locations (Winchester 1986). 
Physical asset recovery from natural disasters can also be wealth-differentiated 
affecting those with less means. Looking at the effects of Mitch on productive assets in 
Honduras, across all pre-Mitch wealth quartiles households without asset losses showed 
substantially higher growth than those that suffered losses 30 months later. However, as of 
2001, the gap was 13.8% for the lowest quartile where poor households had showed -5% net 
growth (loss) over the post-Mitch period, while poor households without losses had 8.8% 
growth, whereas the gap was a smaller 5.1% for the wealthiest quartile (-2.1% versus 3% 
post-Mitch growth) (Carter et al. 2006). 
More generally, a study on poverty and vulnerability in Guatemala in 2000 showed 
how the probability of experiencing a material loss following bad harvests and droughts, 
drops significantly as household wealth rises, after controlling for other potential 
determinants (Tesliuc and Lindert 2002). This regularity seems to endure for other regional 
contexts as well. Richest households in both Burkina Faso and Ethiopia had much higher crop 
yields than the poorest during the severe drought years of 1984/5. For instance, cow milk 
yields in Ethiopia for the richest group were unchanged by the drought at five litres per day 
through the use of purchased feed, but for the poor group, milk yields fell from five to one 
litres per day. In the same group of studies, the richest in Sahelian Burkina Faso and Upland 
Ethiopia appeared better protected from crop price variations than the poorest (Webb and 
Reardon 1992). 
The material incapacity of poor households to protect from natural disasters can end 
in the forced extinction of their few remaining assets or the adoption of strategies which could 
bring about a serious backlash in human development deepening their poverty or even worst 
prolonging their poverty into future generations. 
 
  This could lead to the depletion of an already diminished asset base 
Even if the odds for loosing assets are not tilted against the poorest households, any impact in 
their wealth is likely to have more resounding effects. A survey of rural poor households in 
Honduras shown that by 1999 Hurricane Mitch had destroyed household implements, tools, 
or animals of over one quarter in the highest quintile of wealth compared to just 10 percent of 
the poorest households. But because the poorest had so few assets to start with, the impact of 
the Hurricane losses was much more significant to them: affected households in the lowest  
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quintile of wealth lost nearly 18% of their pre-Mitch asset value and 40% of their total crop 
value, compared to just 3% and 25% respectively for the affected households in the highest 
quintile of pre-Mitch wealth and crop value (Morris et al., 2002). The same conclusion was 
reached by a different study on the impact of Mitch on rural Honduran households: despite 
the percentage of households suffering a loss of productive assets (primarily plantations and 
land) increased with household wealth rising from 22% to 68% from the first to the fourth 
wealth quartile, among those households suffering asset losses, poorer households lost a 
greater percentage of their productive wealth (31%) than did wealthier households (8%) 
(Carter et al, 2006).  
 
 … or to the adoption of strategies that can erode the asset base 
While coping strategies might be useful in the short-term or indeed those who employ them 
face little option, they might hurt long-term development. Some people have proposed three 
stages of coping starting with the adoption of insurance and non-erosive mechanisms; then the 
disposal of productive assets or erosive coping; and ending in destitution or non-coping (De 
Waal 1989; Davies 1996).  Migration is often placed in this last stage perceived as a failure to 
cope. 
Withdrawing children from school to cope with shocks in the presence of credit and 
insurance market failures is also considered an erosive strategy as it is possible that lost 
schooling leads to lifelong losses in the earning ability of children. Poor rural farmers in the 
Semi-Arid Tropic (SAT) region of India rely on child labour, and thereby school attendance, 
as a central self-insurance strategy against income fluctuations arising from rainfall shocks. In 
particular, small farm households are inadequately insured ex ante and therefore have a 
greater probability of taking children out of school after unanticipated weather shocks (Jacoby 
and Skoufias 1995). A similar case of droughts affecting human capital accumulation in the 
presence of credit constraints was observed in the 1962-63 drought in Rajasthan. At that time, 
small farm households relied heavily on wages from public relief works to supplement or as 
sole income whereas large farmers sold their assets. The resulting situation was one of higher 
food prices, falling asset prices (except goats) and a deleterious impact on human capital 
formation as 42 children no longer attended school (Jodha 1975). More recently, evidence 
from poor rural households in Mexico observed over the period 1998-2000, shows an increase 
in child labour as a response to droughts and other climatic hazards in their communities, 
confirming that children are indeed used as risk-coping instruments to respond to natural 
disasters. This is particularly notorious for the 15–18 age group, which is highly vested in the 
labor market with a participation rate of 38.8% (de Janvry et al. 2006). 
Comparable responses have been identified in rural areas of Africa. Exploiting inter-
regional weather variation between 1985 and 1988 and cross-sectional data from Cote 
d’Ivoire it was found that enrolment rates declined by about 20 percentage points for boys and 
girls in shock regions -were rainfall data was more than one absolute standard deviation from 
the historical mean- relative to children in the non-shock regions (Jensen 2000). 
  The adoption of erosive coping responses that may destroy or reduce the asset stock of 
families in response to the absence of other key assets goes beyond education. It can also 
happen with physical, financial, or social capital leading to more permanent effects. In the 
SAT region of India it has been shown how the presence of low incomes combined with 
borrowing constraints and no weather-insurance has led to underinvestment in bullocks which 
are a central production factor for impoverished rural farmers. Bullocks are one of the 
favourite mechanisms used to cope with shocks in rural South India, but this comes at the 
expense of agricultural profitability by not permitting farmers to accumulate larger capital 
goods (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993). 
 
Climate shocks covariance exacerbates the fragility of poor people’s assets  
According to the food security literature, the most heavily used mechanism to compensate for 
shortfalls in income is borrowing for consumption in the informal credit market. The practice 
of going into debt seems to be common among both the urban and rural poor who most 
probably turn to friends and relatives, and from moneylenders who probably charge high  
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interest rates, especially if we consider that access to formal credit markets is uncommon in 
rural areas. However, borrowing to maintain consumption is ineffective when the risk is 
covariate, as many people borrow at the same time pushing up interest rates and rationing 
credit. Even in the presence of informal group-based borrowing institutions interest rates are 
likely to go up as the village credit market is necessarily personal and spatially restricted so 
that severe droughts over consecutive years eventually lead to rising interest rates. Hence, 
borrowing money in the presence of a covariate and prolonged climate shock, especially 
droughts, is likely to send household into a cycle of spiralling debt transforming the resources 
into a financial liability as interest rates go up and the consumption needs remain present. 
In the 1962-63 droughts in Rajasthan, India, borrowing from friends and neighbours 
was the major household coping strategy in the initial three months after the flood. But the 
reliance of poor and flood-exposed households on private sector borrowing had adverse 
implications for their food security and economic growth in the medium term. Fifteen months 
after the flood, 64.2% of flood-exposed households in the bottom 40% of the expenditure 
distribution who were in debt averaged 146% of one month’s average consumption; and for 
the poorest 40% of households flood -and non-flood-exposed, total debts averaged 150% of 
monthly expenditures (Jodha 1975). 
Likewise, the fairly localized but prolonged three-year drought in the mid-1980s in 
the Telangana region within India’s Semi-Arid Tropics Region, where Mahbubnagar villages 
are located, precipitated a sharp rise in borrowing in the informal market in Dokur where the 
large village tank did not fill for rainy season paddy cultivation from 1985/86 to 1987/88. 
During the first drought year the village credit market was found relatively capable of 
financing a surprising amount of consumption credit without appreciable changes in interest, 
but appreciable changes in interest rates were recorded well into the second drought year 
(Bidinger et al. 1991). 
In the 1998 floods in Bangladesh, more than 60% of poor, flood-exposed families in a 
sample of 750 households borrowed money in the months immediately following the flood, 
and of these more than half borrowed money for food. Household debts rose to an average of 
1.5 months of typical consumption compared with only a small percentage of monthly 
consumption in January 1998, about eight months before the floods. The percentage of 
households with outstanding debt one year after the flood decreased progressively from 
November 1998, when it was at the highest with 66% of the households, to 54% in 
November, 1999. Nevertheless, the average amount owed still constituted a large share of the 
total expenditure leaving households vulnerable to another shock (del Ninno et al. 2001). 
Another reason for asking for loans even if moneylenders charge exorbitant interest 
rates could be that poor people refuse to liquidate valuable assets (Fachamps et al. 1998). This 
last-resort action usually takes place to protect consumption. Unfortunately, the aggregate 
nature of climate shocks might condition the usefulness of assets as precautionary savings 
because the oversupply (sale) of assets during times of distress may depress their value as 
everyone tries to sell them at the same time. In addition, the ease with which they can be 
mobilized becomes really circumscribed in the presence of aggregate shocks affecting more 
their value. 
Many regions have witnessed the process of collapse in asset prices when everyone 
tries to sell them at the same time leading to very low returns. The detailed study of the 
1962/63 drought in several villages in Rajasthan India remains the classical example of 
farmers’ response to (except for the prominence of livestock) and the consequences of severe 
drought in India’s SemiArid Tropics (Jodha 1975). At that time, traditional risk management 
methods did little to protect crop and livestock income, which contributed negligibly to 
household sustenance income during the drought year. With scarcity the price of pearl millet, 
the staple food, increased by about 60 percent; and milk prices rose by 280 percent. Most 
households particularly small farm households, relied heavily on wages from public relief 
works while large farm households compensated for the shortfall in agricultural income by 
selling assets, which led to gyrating prices. The price of bullocks declined by 51 percent, dry 
cows by 80 percent, lactating cows by 48 percent, sheep by 60 percent, and bullock carts by 
40 percent.  The only exception was the price of goats, which are more divisible and better  
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acclimate to drought than most other domestic livestock species, that actually went up by 
about 24 percent (Jodha 1975). Ultimately, compared to the year before the drought, food 
grain consumption per day per adult fell by about 14 percent showing how droughts can affect 
health and nutritional outcomes. 
Similarly, the 1999 drought in Ethiopia was also a year of heaviest livestock asset 
reductions, both due to animal deaths as well as sales. Based on interviews in the course of 
qualitative surveys in the study area, it was estimated that 25 percent of livestock reductions 
in 1999 were distress sales at which the seller received less than 50 percent of the normal 
price of the animal sold. Cattle prices, for example, dropped from an average of 625 birr in 
the pre-drought period to 291 birr. Price swings of this magnitude constituted a huge capital 
loss for those forced to sell livestock during this period (Carter et al., 2006). 
The problem of covariation between local shocks and local asset prices has led some 
studies to conclude that livestock does not always serve empirically as a buffer to the extent 
suggested (Fafchamps et al. 1998). However, the interplay between shocks and responses 
such as drawing down assets is inconclusive. Other studies point out at small stock as an 
important mechanism that households can rely on when dealing with risk (Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin 1993) and thus avoid further impacts on human development. During the 1994/95 
drought in Zimbabwe, livestock did appear to buffer the drought impact over children living 
in poor households: a regression of growth in the height of children 12-24 months for children 
residing in households below and above the median value of pre-drought livestock holdings 
found that drought only affected the growth of children residing in poorer households 
(Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001). 
 
  … And so does their frequency 
The frequency and intensity of major disasters is also of great relevance to the recovery of 
poorer households. It has been suggested that in the presence of consecutive negative shocks 
the use of asset savings for consumption smoothing is not compatible with accumulation 
(Deaton, 1992; Dercon, 2002). If bad harvests resulting from climate shocks persist over 
several years in a row households would have to have large stores of assets to smooth 
consumption; otherwise this outcome would be unaccomplished and buffer stocks themselves 
could become depleted. A time series of 100-period horizon simulations over income, 
consumption and assets randomly generated shown that consumption is much smoother than 
income due to the existence of assets that buffer the effects of poor harvests.
9 However, if 
consumption gets protected by assets initially after a shock, in a second consecutive bad 
harvest with no time to build up assets, consumers are left exposed to a succession of poor 
harvest (Deaton, 1992). This makes drought and flood especially bad within the different 
types of natural disasters (Morduch 1999). 
On a more practical basis, a study of drought impact on poverty dynamics in north-
eastern Ethiopia from 1997-2003 with a major drought in-between (1999-2000) found that the 
ability of the poor and very poor in this area to move beyond a certain threshold of asset 
viability before the next drought strikes is limited, and this has been the case for many 
households since at least the 1984 famine in Ethiopia. According to this study, under a very 
optimistic post-drought annual growth rate of about 0.3 TLU per year, it would still take very 
poor households about eight to ten years to reach an asset threshold of around 1.0 TLU per 
capita (an average of 4.5 TLU per household or two oxen, one cow and 15 small stocks would 
be the equivalent of a non-poor household in the area). But because in the past 20 years there 
were major droughts in 1983–84, 1991–92, 1999–2000, and, again, in 2002, and minor ones 
in almost one out of three years, the poor face a situation where once they begin to re-build 
their assets, the next drought wipes out the gains and recovery ensues again. The main 
difference between the poor and non-poor is not that the former have higher post-drought 
recovery rates, but that they rarely reach a level where they can sustain themselves out of 
poverty before the next drought strikes (Little et al. 2006). 
In a study of drought impact in Zimbabwe over 1983-96 in which the country 
experienced four major droughts (in 1982-84, 1986-87, 1991-92 and 1994-95) the problem of 
zero stocks as a result of a series of negative shocks was not relevant for the population as a  
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whole. In fact, wealth in the form of cattle had grown enormously in the panel of households 
studies, in spite of the repeated occurrence of drought. However, if the panel was 
disaggregated the reduction of herd size for particular groups of the population was quite 
dramatic. For instance, in the 1992-93 drought more than 20% of households experienced 
negative changes in herd size in relation to the opening stocks of cattle; Secondly, the extent 
of action by the Zimbabwean government was impeded by the adverse consequences of 
successive droughts. For instance, in the face of continuous risk-mitigation program demands, 
the core budget for the Department of Social Welfare declined in real terms by some 50% 
from one drought to another (1990-91/1994-95). 
  In a similar fashion, there is a general consensus that the 1998 Bangladesh floods had 
a lower impact on the affected population than the 1988 floods, even though the 1998 floods 
were of a considerably longer duration in most places. One of the reasons for this was that 
previous to 1988 there had been two major floods, in 1987 and 1984, which undoubtedly left 
many poorer households in a precarious situation and unable to recover their pre-disaster 
situation before the next disaster occurred (Beck 2005). 
In sum, the impact of climate risks on assets goes beyond their physical extinction. If 
bad harvests resulting from climate shocks persist over several years in a row households 
could find relatively large stores of assets insufficient to smooth consumption. There are other 
asset attributes that could also be affected by the occurrence of climate risks due to their 
aggregate nature. For instance, the fact that assets can hold their value or, in other words, 
maintain a reasonable return and limited risk during times of stress is an important dimension 
that needs to be considered when assessing the specific impact of natural disasters on assets. 
In addition, shocks can affect the returns-generating potential (i.e., sustainability) of an asset 
via the nutrition-adult height-adult productivity conduit early illustrated. 
 
RESILIENCE 
  Some recovery from natural disasters is still possible… 
There is some evidence of catching-up from the effects of weather-induced shocks on 
nutrition, that is, over time children may recover lost nutrition and return to their personal 
growth curve. Full catching up from lost height growth was found in samples from rural India 
and Philippines after controlling for the endogeneity of past anthropometric levels (Behrman, 
Deolalikar and Lavy 1995). However, their results might not be completely valid as they 
conflate children above 3 with children below 3 for whom catch-up growth might not be 
expected (Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001).  
Other studies focusing on weight, rather than height, have produced evidence of 
catching up controlling for all sorts of different effects. In a study of weight gain among 
children in Bangladesh over a three-month period following the 1988 floods, children of less 
weight in the immediate post-flood period tend to grow more over the subsequent period.  
However, there was faster growth among children in better-off households or those who had 
better access to credit markets whereas those children in the landless households were 
especially vulnerable to the conditions created by the flood due to credit constraints (Foster, 
1995). Moreover, as opposed to the considerable evidence linking child height with 
subsequent adult health and other outcomes, there is very limited literature linking lower child 
weight to adult weight, productivity and lifetime earnings. Hence, ultimately, the economic 
importance of these findings remains unclear (Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001). This may be 
because weight fluctuates much more than height in the short-run, and because very short-run 
changes in weight are not necessarily manifest in long-term height growth. But even if some 
catching up results this would not avoid the substantial transitory costs to the child’s health 
(Dercon 2005). 
 
But this is largely driven by the existence of adequate coping mechanisms 
The lack of adequate assets to deal with a shock could largely compromise the growth 
prospects of the household members. In the absence of buffer stocks the household might not 
be able to protect its most vulnerable members or might adopt costly coping strategies for 
both short -and long term well-being. For instance, the 1998 flood in Bangladesh caused  
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many preschool children to lose weight and/or to fail to grow at a critical period in their 
mental and physical development.
10 This situation was brought about by a combination of 
factors, including reduced access to food, the increased difficulties of providing proper care 
for children that came with disruptions in home life and the greater exposure of children to 
contaminants. However, 15 months after the flood, most children appeared to regain the same 
nutritional status they had a few months after the flood (in November 1998). Unfortunately, 
within the flood-exposed households, the percentage of stunted children for those in the 
bottom 40 percentile remained much higher than that of households in the top 20 percentile a 
year after the flood making more likely a long lasting impact on the nutritional status of these 
poor children (del Ninno and Lundberg 2005). 
 
   Coping mechanisms in turn seem to be strongly determined by wealth 
Recovery is also possible on productive assets affected by natural disasters. However, as 
suggested by the cases of weight recovery and nutritional status of Bangladeshi children, this 
recovery might be wealth-differentiated militating against any tendency of the poor to catch 
up with wealthier households. Moreover, as noted earlier, those households with limited 
resources for dealing with hardships could end up adopting coping strategies which erode the 
subsistence base of the household thereby compromising its future recovery or the prospects 
of some of its members. For instance, rather than keeping livestock for productive purposes 
households could be forced to sell them out to meet short-term needs; or instead of keeping 
children in school to enhance their human capital parents pull them out to involve them in 
remunerative activities. A couple of studies on asset dynamics and recovery experiences in 
the wake of environmental shocks in Ethiopia (three-year drought during the late 1990s) and 
Honduras (Hurricane Mitch in 1998) reveal that the poorest households appear to be forced 
into long-term poverty traps as they have to dispose of valuable assets which are then needed 
for recovery and in consequence struggle several years after the shocks to recover their pre-
shock asset levels if ever.  
Looking at pre-drought and recovery livestock growth trajectories for a sample of 
rural Ethiopian households tracked over a seven-year period from 1996 to 2003  
it was found that the better endowed decumulate assets faster in the course of experiencing a 
series of droughts, and also that this group was relatively better equipped to rebuild assets in 
the wake of these shocks. The growth rate of livestock was found to be increasing in herd size 
up to a level of 25 tropical livestock units (TLUs)
11 indicating that households that exited the 
drought with few livestock were strongly disadvantaged in their rate of recovery period 
growth. Moreover, community membership in social organizations (social capital) increased 
the rate of growth (or limited the rate of loss) of livestock over the six years, but again 
primarily for households in the higher wealth groups (Carter et al. 2006). 
Likewise, a study over a sample of rural Honduran households on the impact of 
Hurricane Mitch in 1998 on the value of land, plantations, machinery and livestock right after 
the shock as well as their evolution up to 2001, two and half years after Mitch, also proved 
that post-shock resilience displays a strongly wealth-differentiated pattern, especially in the 
absence of labour and capital markets.
12 With absent good market access, a low wealth 
household that experienced an immediate 31% asset loss went through further declines and a 
net asset growth rate of -48% from its pre-Mitch position to the time of the study 30 months 
later. In contrast, a wealthier household that experienced an identical 31% loss recovered 
partially from the loss and exhibit a net growth rate of -14%. But given that wealthier 
households on average only lost 7.5% of their assets (not 31%), then the unequalising effect 
of the shock was further magnified. Interestingly, under labour and capital market access, 
lower wealth households would be able to offset much of the 31% asset loss (climbing back 
to a net asset change of -10%) while wealthier households would also benefit slightly from 
better market access, giving place to almost a complete elimination of the final recovery gap 






Hurricane Mitch: wealth differentiated damage and recovery 
Hurricane Mitch hit Honduras –as well as other areas of Central America- from 25 October to 
1 November 1998. As it moved inland and remained static over the isthmus for days, it resulted in the 
largest natural disaster experienced in the recent memory of the country. 
Honduras is well-known for its vulnerability to natural disasters, including seismic and 
volcanic activity, hurricanes and tropical storms. However, man-made factors compound this 
vulnerability. Environmental degradation, in particular the loss of hillside pine forests mainly due to 
extensive logging and slash and burn agricultural practices created the conditions for massive flooding 
and landslides during the Hurricane. In addition, massive disparities in the distribution of wealth had 
historically pushed wider segments of the population into marginal areas with a limited ability to 
manage this type of shocks due to low asset holdings and manifest constraints to access credit and 
insurance markets. 
The disaster affected over 1.5 million people, the highest on record for any disaster in 
Honduras, including: 5,757 dead, 12,272 injured and 8,058 reported missing; 441,150 people 
displaced; and over 4.2 million people without access to running water or the equivalent to 70% of the 
entire population. Health problems skyrocketed including gastro-intestinal infections, acute respiratory 
infections, dehydration, and injuries caused by the floods. Even leptospirosis, which had been virtually 
non-existent in the previous year, reappeared. 
Beyond the immediate death toll, Mitch severely damaged or destroyed key productive assets, 
seriously disrupting the livelihoods of many households permanently. Agricultural output dropped 
dramatically, as livestock animals were lost or drowned, and land became largely infertile or eroded, 
because the flooding basically washed away the productive topsoil and dumped rocks all over the fields 
or covered them in mud. Roads, hospitals, and even prisons, were damaged or destroyed on a massive 
scale as well. The loss to the economy has been estimated at some US$4 billion. 
With over half of its total population living in poverty and about the same share of the total 
population (49%) living in rural areas, it was the rural poor who bear the brunt of the impact, even 
though many of them were not living in the northern coast and the southern watersheds -the most 
affected areas by the Hurricane. According to poverty estimates before and after Mitch the share of 
rural households living in poverty following Mitch increased about five percentage points, from 69.2 % 
to 74.6%. 
And more precisely it was on the poorest of the rural poor where the Hurricane had the more 
resounding effects. A survey of rural poor households in Honduras shown that by 1999 Mitch had 
destroyed the household implements, farming tools, or animals of over one quarter in the highest 
quintile of wealth compared to just 10 percent of the poorest households. But because the poorest had 
so few assets to start with, the affected households in the lowest quintile of wealth lost nearly 18% of 
their pre-Mitch asset value and 40% of their total crop value, compared to just 3% and 25% 
respectively for the affected households in the highest quintile of pre-Mitch wealth and crop value. 
Recovery on productive assets for the poorest households would have been easier in the 
presence of labour and capital markets, but in their absence this recovery became wealth-differentiated 
militating against any tendency of the poor to catch up with wealthier households. More importantly, a 
study on asset dynamics and recovery experiences in the wake of Mitch revealed that the poorest 
appear to be forced into long-term poverty traps as they have to dispose of valuable assets, which were 
then needed for recovery and in consequence struggle several years after the shocks to recover their 
pre-shock asset levels if ever.  
Tracking the value of land, plantations, machinery and livestock of rural Honduran right after 
the shock as well as their evolution up to 2001, two and half years after Mitch, proved that with absent 
off-farm labour market earnings and access to credit,
 a low wealth household that experienced an 
immediate 31% asset loss went through further declines and a net asset growth rate of -48% from its 
pre-Mitch position to 30 months later. In contrast, a wealthier household that experienced an identical 
31% loss recovered partially from the loss and exhibit a net growth rate of -14%. But given that 
wealthier households on average only lost 7.5% of their assets (not 31%), then the unequalising effect 
of the shock was further magnified. Under labour and capital market access, lower wealth households 
would have been able to offset much of the 31% asset loss (climbing back to a net asset change of -
10%) while wealthier households would also benefit slightly from better market access, giving place to 
almost a complete elimination of the final recovery gap between poor and rich households. 
 






The organisation of livelihoods before shocks materialise can impact on asset returns 
Household’s assets can also be affected by uninsured climate risks before they actually take 
place through the adoption of asset and activity decisions. An ex-ante or behavioural impact 
on assets occurs when households faced with the prospects of droughts or other serious 
climate shock that would affect their welfare have no assets to rely on and thus are pushed 
into sub-optimal risk mitigation strategies such as the adoption of low risk activities and asset 
portfolios at the expense of lower mean returns and incomes. 
Household behaviour in terms of investment and activity portfolios is also mediated 
by the stock of wealth available to cope with shocks. In rural Ethiopia the use of fertilisers 
usually result in higher yields and substantial returns on average. However, the application 
rates for their use between 1994 and 1999 were substantially lower due to the farmers’ 
inability to cope with the consequences of droughts (i.e., when rains fail financial returns to 
fertiliser use are typically very low or negative given its sunk cost). Fertiliser application rates 
would be up 43 percent if downside consumption risk were to be reduced by one standard 
deviation (Dercon and Christiaensen 2005). In other words, fertiliser uptake in Ethiopia 
would be substantially higher if some insurance were to be offered against downside 
consumption risk thus avoiding lower short-term returns of crops in its absence. 
  Similarly, rural farmers in Tanzania grow sweet potatoes more than any other major 
crop (sorghum, maize and cotton) despite having returns per hectare at least 25% below them. 
Households grow this crop because of its high resistance to droughts becoming a low yield 
risk, and simultaneously because no alternative consumption security mechanisms or liquid 
assets are available to them. In contrast, a household with an average livestock holding would 
have a proportion of land allocated to sweet potatoes 20% smaller than that of a household 
with no liquid assets. As a consequence, the crop portfolio of the richest quintile yields 25 
percent more per adult than that of the poorest quintile (Dercon 1996). A similar conclusion 
was reached by a study in rural South India were asset-poor households devote a larger share 
of land to rice and castor which are low-risk low value activities. If only the lowest wealth 
group were provided the same protection as the highest wealth group that would result in 25-
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1 This distinction makes risk different from uncertainty in the sense that under uncertainty the probability 
distribution of events is unknown, there is no way to attach probabilities to events occurring (Dercon 2001). Some 
authors treat the terms risk and uncertainty interchangeably (Siegel and Alwang, 1999). 
2 The distribution of exposure to hazards over the planet’s surface is non-uniform. Four-fifths of the planet’s 
volcanic activity occurs in the so-called Circum-Pacific Volcanic Belt, within which are located many Asian and 
Latin American countries. The droughts that regularly follow the onset of El Niño years are concentrated in 
Southern Africa and South Asia. The El Niño-related “malarial fringe” is located along coastal regions of South 
America and South Asia. On the other hand, poor people live in housing of poorer quality, and often on marginal 
land; they face liquidity constraints that limit their access to saving or insurance in the face of risk; they cannot as 
readily escape disaster zones; their human capital is lower and more vulnerable to shocks, as when poor 
households decide to withdraw children from school so that they may earn labour income (Anderson, 2000). 
3 A strand of research called critical-period programming deals with the link between early life conditions and 
outcomes later in life. The idea is that the fetal stage and infancy are critical periods in physical development, and 
that early-life shocks can have long-lasting effects on health. When facing low nutrition or other adverse health 
conditions, the developing fetus or infant prioritizes the brain to receive limited resources, compromising the 
development of other organ systems. The damage is to some extent irreversible, and the individual is thus 
‘programmed’ for worse health later in life. 
4 Results are based on a model regressing the change in BMI (natural logarithm of BMI) on the previous level of 
BMI, shocks and a number of time-varying control variables, as well as controlling for fixed effect in the change in 
BMI. 
5 A third of
 those measured as grade
 II or grade III
 malnourished have some difficulty
 hoeing a field, compared
 to 
less than 15
 percent of normally nourished
 adults. Almost a quarter
 of the adults who
 are grade III malnourished
 
cannot hoe a field.
 Other activities such as
 carrying water for a
 short distance displayed similar
 correlations. 
6 This was done linking historical rainfall for each individual’s birth-year and birth-location with their current adult 
outcomes from the 2000 wave of the Indonesia Family Life Survey. 
7 Hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua affected around 19% of the population (870,000 people). Almost half (45.8%) of 
the households surveyed in the 1999 LSMS reported their dwellings being harmed during the hurricane and, in 
fact, 29.4% had to temporarily leave their home. Furthermore, 17.3% of the affected households moved 
permanently to another residence due to Mitch (Baez and Santos, 2007). In post-tsunami Indonesia, the sector that 
experienced most damage was housing and human settlements: 141,000 houses were destroyed, which accounts 
for 47.9 per cent of the total damage (Telford et al., 2006).  
8 Land located in an active river basin that is subject to erosion and accretion. 
9 This simulation was based on a model of self-insurance through savings under presence of imperfect credit 
markets where households maximize expected utility over time and have precautionary motives for saving (from 
which they receive a safe return). Also, they behave as if there was an infinite planning horizon building up assets 
in good years to draw them down when income is poor –and thus leading to a time when assets get exhausted. 
10 In this analysis, households were classified according to their level of direct exposure to the flood using a 
household’s flood exposure index, which includes the depth of water in the homestead and in the house, and also 
the duration (number of days) of water in the house.
, 
11 A tropical livestock unit (TLU) is a measure that weights together different kinds of animals into cattle 
equivalents. 
12 The labor market indicator is the average off-farm labor market earnings within its community, and the capital 
access measure was designed from a set of questions to probe if the household was price rationed in the credit 
market or not. 
 
 
 